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Corporations-De Facto Merger-Minority Shareholder's
Appraisal Rights
At common law a dissenting shareholder could prevent corporate
reorganization by merger,' consolidation, 2 or sale of assets' on the
theory that such a change would violate the "contract of association"
to incorporate for a particular purpose4 or change the essential
nature of the shareholder's investment.5 In many instances shareholders took advantage of this right by threatening to enjoin proposed sales and mergers and thus were able to command exorbitant
prices for their stock.6 Due in part to this abuse and in part to a
corporate need for more flexibility, 7 statutes have been passed
restricting, the right of dissatisfied shareholders to dissent from
corporate transactions and allowing them to receive fair value' for
their shares in specific instances.9
In many jurisdictions this right of dissenting shareholders is
limited by statute to situations in which the proposed change in
corporate form occurs by merger or consolidation." Other jurisdictions grant a dissenting shareholder the right to invoke judicial aid
when the corporate change occurs by sale of assets,"l as well as by
'See, e.g., Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 149, 172 Atl. 452,
455 (1934) (dictum).
See, e.g., Spencer v. Railroad, 137 N.C. 107, 119-20, 49 S.E. 96, 101
(1904) (dictum). See also Carolina Coach Co. v. Hartness, 198 N.C. 524,
528, 152 S.E. 489, 491 (1930), which distinguished between merger and consolidation stating that "merger (is) the absorption of a thing of lesser importance by a greater, whereby the lesser ceases to exist, but the greater is
not increased...; But... the legal effect of consolidation is to extinguish
the constituent companies' and create a new corporation." For a statutory
distinction see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-110(a) (1960).
'See, e.g., Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 598
(1921) (dictum); Kean v. Johnson, 9 N.J. Eq. 401, 414 (Ch. 1853).
"Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R.R., 30 Pa. 42 (1858).
'See Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 598 (1921)
(dictum); Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R.R., supra note 4.
' See Johnson v. Baldwin, 221 S.C. 141, 154, 69 S.E.2d 585, 591 (1952)
(dictum).
'See Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal R6nedi: An Essay for
Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 228-30 (1962).
'See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-113(c), (e) (1960), which designates
the time for appraisal and places a minimum limitation on "fair value."
'See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-113 (1960).
'See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §262 (1953). Eight states provide
that merger and consolidation shall be the only triggering transactions. For a
list of these see Manning, supra note 7, at 262-63.
"See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-113 (1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 2852-311(D) (1958); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-5 (1939).
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merger and consolidation. 2 Since a sale of assets may have the same
end result as a merger,' 3 dissatisfied shareholders in jurisdictions
which do not provide a statutory right of appraisal upon a sale of
assets have contended for recognition of the judicial doctrine of
de facto merger. That is, the shareholder contends:
that the transaction, though in form a sale of assets... is in substance and effect a merger, and that it is unlawful because the
merger statute has not been complied with, thereby depriving (the
shareholder) of his right of appraisal. 14
In Delaware, where statutory appraisal rights are accorded only
in instances of merger and consolidation, 5 the supreme court recently rejected such a contention in Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc. 6
Arco Electronics proposed to sell its assets to Loral Electronics pursuant to the Delaware sale-of-assets statute. Arco was to transfer
its assets to Loral in exchange for Loral stock and the assumption
by Loral of all Arco's liabilities. Upon dosing the transactioi Arco
was to distribute the Loral stock to its shareholders and dissolve. A
minority shareholder in the selling corporation brought suit to
enjoin the proposed sale, contending that the transaction was a
de facto merger.:'
While recognizing that the sale of assets had the same effect as
would have been achieved by merger, the court pointed out that this
result was permitted by the overlapping scope of the merger statute
and the sale-of-assets statute.' 9 The court made no reference to the
" All states except West Virginia provide for appraisal rights to dissenting shareholders upon merger or consolidation.
See text at notes 17-18 infra.
1
'Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 182 A.2d 22, 24 (Del. Ch. 1962),
aft'd, 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963).
1"

DEL. CODE ANN. tit.

8, § 262 (1953).

" 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963), affirming 182 A.2d 22 (Del. Ch. 1962). For
a complete discussion of the implications of this case see Folk, De Facto
Mergers In Delaware:Haritonv. Arco Electronics, Inc., 49 Va. L. Rev. 1261
(1963).
17 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (1953).
18
In Heilbrun v. Sun Chemical Co., 38 Del. Ch. 321, 150 A.2d 755 (Sup.
Ct. 1959), affirning 37 Del. Ch. 552, 146 A.2d 757 (Ch. 1958), the Delaware court had "expressly observed" the issue which arose in Hariton, but
had refused to decide it because the complaining shareholder was a member
of the purchasing corporation and was deemed not to have suffered any
damage.
"o"This is so because the sale of assets statute and the merger statute
are independent of each other. They. are, so to speak, of equal dignity, and
the framers of a reorganization plan may resort to either type of corporate
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shareholder's claim that he was being forced to accept stock in a
different corporation. However, the lower court had given the following answer to that contention:
The stockholder was, in contemplation of law, aware of this right
(to make a sale of assets to another corporation) when he acquired the stock. He was also aware of the fact that the situation
might develop whereby he would be ultimately forced to accept a
new investment,.. .20

On the other hand Pennsylvania, another important commercial
jurisdiction, has found considerably more merit in the de facto
merger doctrine. In Farrisv. Glen Alden Corp.21 the Pennsylvania
court said that the appraisal remedy was available in any case where
the new corporate combination effected, a change in the essential
nature of the corporation, or disturbed the relationship existing
between shareholders or between shareholders and the corporation.
Since the reorganization changed Glen Alden from a coal mining
company into a diversified company with additional holdings in the
fields of entertainment, real estate, and manufacturing, the court
said that its "corporate character" had been changed.22
Before granting appraisal rights to a shareholder of the purchasing corporation, however, the Pennsylvania court still had a difficult
obstacle to hurdle. Faced with statutory language granting the appraisal remedy to a seller of assets23 but expressly denying it to a
purchaser,2 4 the court said that the statute only applied to instances
in which reorganization was accomplished by a sale of assets without
mechanics to achieve the desired end." Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc.,
188 A.2d 123, 125 (Del. 1963), affirming 182 A.2d 22 (Del. Ch. 1962).

" Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., supra note 19, at 26. Although

Hariton would seem to preclude the application of the de facto merger doctrine in Delaware, the court still purports to recognize the doctrine. See
Orzeck v. Englehart, 195 A.2d 375 (Del. 1963), affirning 192 A.2d 36 (Del.
Ch. 1963). However the court has only applied the doctrine where the parties to the reorganization failed to comply with some statutory provision
pertaining to the transaction, to the prejudice of the shareholder. See Drug,
Inc. v. Hunt, 35 Del. 339, 168 Atl. 87 (1933); Finch v. Warrior Cement
Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 44, 141 Adt. 54 (1928).
" 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958).

" Other Pennsylvania cases have been decided along similar lines. See

Troupiansky v. Henry Disston & Sons, 151 F. Supp. 609 (E.D. Pa. 1957);
Marks v. Autocar Co., 153 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Pa. 1954); Bloch v. Baldwin
Locomotive Works, 75 Pa. D. & C. 24 (C.P. 1950).
2" PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-311(D) (f958).
PA. STAT. ANN tit. 15, § 2852-908(C) (1958).
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nore and that if the shareholder's common law rights were to be
abrogated, a more specific statute was necessary.25 Then, almost
as an afterthought, the court advanced another, perhaps sounder,
principle upon which the decision could be based. The court recognized that Glen Alden presented a situation in which the corporation designated by the parties as the seller was actually the buyer,2 6
and said that in such a situation it would look through the nominal
designation of the parties to the substance of the transaction.
Further, the New Jersey court has recognized the de facto
merger doctrine in a similar situation. An exchange of one corporation's shares for those of another can bear as much resemblance to
merger and consolidation as does a sale of assets for shares in the
buying corporation.27 In Applestein v. United Board & Carton
Corp.28 the New Jersey court held that a transaction intended to
effect a consolidation by means of an exchange of shares and a
subsequent dissolution of the smaller corporation so closely resembled a de lure merger that it would be treated as a merger in fact.
New Jersery has a statutory scheme granting appraisal rights when
there is a merger, 29 consolidation, 0 or sale of assets s 1 -making no
mention of exchange of shares. However, the court said that it made
no difference because "every factor present in a corporate merger is
"5The court reached this decision despite the express language of the
statute and evidence that this interpretation was contrary to the intention
of the drafters of the statute. See Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427,
436-37, 143 A.2d 25, 30-31 (1958).
26 Previous to the reorganization, List (the "seller") owned 38.5% of
Glen Alden's (the "buyer") stock. When Glen Alden acquired all the stock
of List for its own stock, this gave List effective control of Glen Alden with
76.5% of Glen Alden's stock. This problem has been settled in regard to
which party receives appraisal rights by PA. STAT. ANN. tit 15, § 2852-

311(F) (Supp. 1962), which denies appraisal rights to the buyer unless it
makes the purchase with more than 50% of its voting shares.
"'In Orzeck v. Englehart, 192 A.2d 36, 38 (Del. Ch. 1963), aff'd, 195

A.2d 375 (Del. 1963), the court said that a sale of assets and an exchange
of shares are not so similar that the same reasoning should apply to both in
regard to de facto merger. This position may be reached by distinguishing
the component parts of the transactions; however, from the position of a
dissenting shareholder, the end result of one may be indistinguishable from
the other.
2 60 N.J. Super. 333, 159 A.2d 146 (Ch.), aff'd per curiam, 33 N.J. 72,
161 A.2d 474 (1960).
"DN.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:12-6 (Supp. 1962).
00Ibid.

11N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 14:3-5 (1939).
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found in this... plan, except... a formal designation of the transaction as a 'merger.' "32

Both the Delaware and the Pennsylvania-New Jersey views on
the de facto merger doctrine have some merit. No statute grants
appraisal rights in a purchase of assets or an exchange of shares
situation; therefore, if the statute is interpreted as an exclusive
remedy, there can be no de facto merger doctrine. It is worth noting
that more than half the appraisal statutes expressly grant appraisal
rights for a sale of assets, 33 so that the omission of purchase of assets
might be deemed intentional.84 Furthermore, a shareholder could
not prevent an exchange of shares at common law, 5 and it can, therefore, be argued that the want of an appraisal remedy in such a situation does not deprive the shareholder of any former right.8" Neither
the Pennsylvania nor the New Jersey court has decided the exact
elements necessary to constitute a de facto merger, and this lack of
certainty would cause litigation in practically every case,8 7 thereby
diminishing the advantage which the appraisal remedy would afford
the shareholder, while still allowing the shareholder to "hold up" the
corporation due to the expense of defending against claims."8 Any
hard and fast rule that the court would treat as a merger any sale of
assets or exchange of shares which had the same effect as a merger
would, in effect, remove from consideration all means of corporate
reorganization except merger.8 9
On the other hand the fact that practically all jurisdictions grant
appraisal rights to all shareholders who dissent from a merger 40
would seem to indicate that courts still adhere to the theory that
one should not be compelled to accept stock in a different corpora3

Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 60 N.J. Super. 333, 348,
159 A.2d 146, 154 (Ch.), aff'd per curiam, 33 N.J. 72, 161 A.2d 474 (1960).
" Thirty-seven states grant appraisal upon a sale of assets. For a list of
these see Manning, supra note 7, at 262-65.
" This was relied on in Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 182 A.2d
22, 25 (Del. Ch. 1962), aff'd, 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963).
" At common law the only check on the right of alienation was an action
for fraud. Presently this right is checked by a fiduciary duty toward the
minority imposed upon directors and officers. See Folk, supra note 16, at
1276.
" See text at notes 1-5 supra. Also see Note, 58 CoL. L. REV. 251, 253
(1958).
'7 See Note, 72 HARv. L. Rxv.
1132, 1144 (1959).
"sId. at 1133 n.6.
" See Folk, supra note 16, at 1276.
"'See note 11 supra.
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tion.4 ' As a sale of assets or exchange of shares, when coupled with
an assumption of the seller's liabilities by the buyer and compelled
dissolution of the seller, places the minority shareholder in exactly
the same position as does a merger, it would seem logically inconsistent to refuse the shareholder the remedy which is available in a
merger.42 The appraisal argument is not very compelling when the
business is merely changed from a coal mining company to an ice
cream company ;43 however, when the change is from an income
company to a growth company and the shareholder cannot readily
dispose of his interest, the argument is more persuasive because the
shareholder's investment has truly been changed.
The appraisal provisions of the North Carolina Business Corporation Act are similar to those of Pennsylvania and New Jersey in
that the act expressly grants appraisal rights for merger, consolidation, and sale of assets.44 Like the statutes of all other jurisdictions,
the act does not provide for appraisal rights upon a purchase of
assets or exchange of shares. There are no decisions which indicate
whether the court would accept the de facto merger doctrine; therefore the matter is open for speculation. The only indication of
intent left by the drafters of the act is the statement that appraisal
rights are given for sales of assets because this is "frequently nothing
more than a de factor (sic) merger and hence should be analogized
to merger as much as possible. '"45
As the North Carolina court is not bound by any existing precedent, it may select either path in deciding whether to grant
"'Delaware holds to the contrary. See Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc.,
182 A.2d 23, 26 (Del. Ch. 1962), aff'd, 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963).
"See Note, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1132, 1143 (1959).
"If only the type of business in which the corporation is engaged is
changed, this would seem an insufficient reason to grant appraisal rights as
the same results could be reached by charter amendment or a change in
the "business policy" of the corporation, neither of which would trigger any
appraisal statute.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-113 (1960) provides that the sale of assets must
be for shares of the puchasing corporation before appraisal rights are
granted. In addition to transactions under consideration in connection with
de facto merger, the North Carolina act also allows appraisal rights in the
event of the following: charter amendments which would change the corporation into a non-profit or cooperative organization; charter amendments
or offers of exchange which would affect dividend and liquidation preferences;
and liquidation by transfer of assets in kind to shareholders. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. §55-101(b) (1960); N.C. GEN. STAT. §55-102 (1960); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-119(b) (1960).
" S. 49, N.C. Sess. 1955, § 112 (comment).
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appraisal rights for transactions not specifically mentioned by
statute. The case-law emphasis in other jurisdictions has been concerned with broad interpretations of legislative intent; however, the
real problem is that the form of the transaction has been made the
controlling factor while the pertinent question of whether there
should be appraisal rights at all has been overlooked. The granting
of this remedy compels a loss of mobility to the corporation40 and
reduces the speed and effectiveness with which the corporation can
make decisions. It is expensive 47 and uncertain, as the corporation
never knows how many dissenters to expect. The resulting flow of
cash away from the corporation may frighten creditors and cause
reorganization plans to be cancelled. 4s These may well be adequate
reasons for refusing appraisal rights in all situations, but deciding
whether or not they are to be granted on the basis of the form of the
transaction alone does not meet the problem squarely. Certainly
such a rule enables a corporation to-avoid granting appraisal rights
simply by adopting a certain form for the transaction, but even the
severest critics of appraisal rights admit their utility in "no market"
situations49 which are often found when dealing with closely held
corporations. To grant relief in such situations and still preserve a
maximum of corporate freedom, granting the remedy should depend
on the effect of the transactions, rather than their form, and this
would involve a thorough revamping of the appraisal statutes.
WALTER RAND, III

Corporations-Unlawful Proxy Solicitation Under Securities
Exchange Act-Rights of Shareholders-Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts to Grant Retrospective Relief
Under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1
it is unlawful to solicit proxies in violation of the Securities Ex"7 See Note, 59 COL. L. Rav. 366, 368 (1959).
' In Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 431 n.5, 143 A.2d 25, 28

n.5 (1958), it was conceded that the reorganization plan would fail if ap-

praisal rights were given, due to the expense involved.
8For a good discussion of "the company's perspective" see Manning,
supra note 7, at 233-39.
"Id. at 260-62.
shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce... or otherwise to solicit
or permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy...in respect of any seS"It

